Asia is narrated in Japanese foreign policy pronouncements as an opportunity as well as a threat. Despite the purported transformation from militarism to pacifism since August 1945, the reified images of Asia as an 'entity out there' remain resilient. The image of a dangerous Asia prompted Japan to engage in its programme of colonialism before the War; and compels policy makers to address territorial disputes with Asian neighbours today. Simultaneously, Asia persistently symbolises an opportunity for Tokyo to exploit. Hence, despite the psychological rupture of August 1945, reified Asia remains a reality in Japanese foreign policy.
Introduction
Despite the end of the Second World War, which saw prewar militarism superseded by postwar pacifism, Japan's outlook on Asia remains largely unchanged. Official Japanese narratives still display a sense of awkwardness about its Asian existence.
The Japanese government's reaction to the resurgence of territorial disputes with its neighbours since the summer of 2012 reinforced the image of Asia as a potential threat-an idea reminiscent of the prewar interpretation of the international environment that prompted Japan to engage in its own programme of colonisation at the turn of the last century (Iriye 1991: 13-15) . Simultaneously, Tokyo is keen to leverage the economic dynamism of Asia as a potential solution to its 'lost decades', providing another parallel to Japan's prewar Asia imaginary: that Asia is a source of opportunity indispensable to Japan's wellbeing. Hence, Asia remains a socially constructed entity that poses opportunities for Japanese leadership to exercise its selfproclaimed leadership role, on the one hand; but the legacies of the past and the concomitant absence of regional institutional structure means that Asia is understood as a dangerous place, on the other. In short, Asia remains a reified entity with multiple meanings for the Japanese leadership. 'opportunity' and 'threat' had become a default set of signifiers within Japanese foreign policy circles to 'talk about' international challenges facing Japan.
This article investigates how the Japanese constructions of Asian Otherness have reified Asia into a 'thing out there' to be identified as an opportunity as well as a threat in foreign policy narratives through the decades, and explores the implications for Japanese foreign policy today. The first section provides a brief overview of the main issues surrounding Japan's relations with Asia. The second section takes reification seriously, focusing on the possibility of reification as a social phenomenon with implications for policy outcomes. Reification matters, since it allows policy makers and theorists alike to talk about complex entities as tangible things to be studied and analysed. I argue that Asia has generally been reified into a notional entity with multiple meanings across the decades. However, it is also the case that the particular Japanese constructions of Asian Otherness have reified Asia into symbols that signify both an opportunity and a threat-a signifier that provides a frame of reference for contemporary Japanese foreign policy narratives. The third section explores the enmeshing of threat and opportunity in prewar Japanese foreign policy narratives, while the fourth section looks at the constructions of Asia during the Cold War. The fifth section investigates contemporary foreign policy narratives that reproduce the image of Asia as both an opportunity and a threat. The sixth section explores the implications for Japanese foreign policy. Japanese policy makers reify Asia the way they do because they need to be able to 'talk about' the challenges posed by the inherently complex region. This is why reification needs to be taken seriously.
Japan and Asia
Japan's geographical proximity to the Asian continent implies that Asia remains firmly within Japanese policy makers' gaze. Yoon Keun Cha (1997: 176-77) notes that Asia constitutes a signifier that exemplifies Japan's position as a 'non-Western' nation, while the perceived backwardness of Asia reinforced Japan's perceived uniqueness. Japanese elites in the 19 th century shared the view that a weak Asia was being devoured by the West, ultimately symbolising Asia's purported 'backwardness'.
This translated into the notion that Japan, which embarked on rapid modernisation following the Meiji Restoration of 1868, was superior to backward Asia (Yoon 1997: 79) . As Takeuchi Yoshimi (1993: 294) notes, such hierarchicalised worldview also translated into a sense of camaraderie (rentai) between Japan and Asia.
In a similar vein, Iriye Akira (1966: 42-43) observes that 'prewar Japanese leaders thought Japan and China should co-operate to establish peace and prosperity in Asia, but witnessing China's weakness, Japanese leaders also felt that Japan needed to establish itself as a leader (meishu) of Asia'. Japan's prewar militarism was underpinned by such an egotistical liberator identity compelled Japanese leadership to force change upon Asia (Iriye 1966: Chapter 6) . Iriye (1991: 13-18) further notes that the prewar elites felt that the West and Japan were fundamentally irreconcilable, lending credence to the egotistical notion that Japan should lead the rest of Asia in its resistance against the West. Such views also encouraged intellectuals to justify the War as a war of liberation (Takeuchi 1979 ).
The prewar liberationist narrative was superseded by its postwar counterpart, in which a pacifist Japan was determined to pursue peaceful interdependence.
Superficially, the prewar Japanese Self of egotistical liberator seems to have been superseded by a peaceful Japanese Self after the War. Yet, the indications are that Asia remains reified as symbolising Japan's precarious position. Bert Edström (1999: 51) observes that 'Japan saw its role in Asia as a promoter of peace, as well as a bridge between the East and West'. Reflecting on Prime Minister Satō Eisaku's February 1970 speech, Edström (1999: 63) argues that,
The oldish view of Japan as excelling over Asia is seen in one statement Japan should build a base for a spiritually as well as materially rich national life in 'advance of all other countries in the world' as a country that was to excel over other Asian countries in the quest for welfare and prosperity. It was 'significant from the point of view of the history of the world civilization that such things should be realized by Japan, which is a member of Asia'. Edström (1999: 146) notes that such a view continued into the post-Cold War period, with Prime Minister Kaifu Toshiki suggesting that Japan needed to be a spokesman for Asia, vis-à-vis, the 'West'. Hence, Asia remains a recurring theme in Japanese foreign policy narratives.
As Wakamiya Yoshibumi (2006: 121) states, 'Japan never felt it lost Asia.
While the Western "enemies" evolved into "allies", the sense of superiority towards Asia remained intact'. Glenn Hook, et al., (2012: 162) also suggest that '[the legacies of colonialism have] served as a structural barrier to distance Japan from closer political, economic and security ties with the region in the post-war era'. For them (2012: 163) , 'the aftermath of the implosion of Japanese imperialism and the political space that it produced helped to create a geographical landscape conducive to the application of bipolarity and the emergence of a new Cold War order in the region'.
Hence, within the Japanese policy elites' gaze, Asia remains an opportunity as well as a source of threat. According to Hook, et al., (2012: 232 ), Japan's defeat 'raised once again the international structural barrier of the legacy of colonialism to security interaction between Japan and the newly independent states of the region', and that, Japanese policy makers themselves also remain reluctant to exercise leadership from the front; to exploit the opportunities of Asianism and internationalism to the full; and to endorse frameworks which could form an exclusive regional body centred upon Japan, and which would generate tensions with China, the US and other states in the region (Hook, et al. 2012: 252) .
Therefore, Asia remains a notional entity for generations of Japanese policy makers to 'talk about' and reification is employed to expedite foreign policy making. The meanings attached to Asia might be ethnocentric and egotistical with a tinge of condescension. In any event, reified Asia is a product of Japan's exposure to the challenges posed by events in and around Asia.
Reification as Social Reality
The term reification is usually a curse in International Relations (IR) theorising, employed mainly to criticise fellow theorists for their failure to consider the complexities of social reality. The accusations and counter-accusations of reification have become more familiar in IR theory debates following the emergence of Constructivism and the subsequent turn to Metatheory and the Philosophy of Social
Science (see Schiff 2008; Michel 2012; Kessler 2012 ). Yet, there is an important facet to reification: reification of social constructs enables social actors to talk about complex intangible entities as if they are identifiable things. While reification as part of an ontological commitment in theory-building might be controversial (Jackson 2011) , there is nothing inherently wrong with applying this term to the psychological landscapes shared by practitioners, just as IR theorists share epistemological landscapes when they tell stories about the complexities of the international environment. In short, practitioners and theorists alike employ reification to render complex reality into workable models.
Humans employ reification as a way to navigate the complex social world (Searle 1995 
Reified Asia in Prewar Japan
Asia as a diverse region provided a fertile platform upon which reification was employed to rationalise its inherent complexities. As a notional entity, as well as a geographical reality, prewar Japanese foreign policy narratives constructed Asia into a symbol denoting Japan's perceived vulnerability, as well as opportunities that needed exploiting. Asia has been imagined as a potential conduit for Western colonisers who were already 'devouring' China, as well as an object of desire in Japan's selfproclaimed identity as a 'liberator' and as a valuable source of resources. The variations in Japanese images of Asian Otherness derived from the various ways in which prewar policy elites in Tokyo attached meanings determined by the perceived diplomatic imperatives and national interests of the time. Maruyama Masao (1961: 9) argues that the 'opening' (kaikoku) in the mid-1850s was tantamount to an exposure to the Realpolitik of Great Power rivalry. The decision to send troops to Taiwan in 1874, followed by an expedition to Korea in 1875, needs to be interpreted as an effort at addressing Japan's purported security concerns. As Seki Shizuo (1999: 3) notes, while the political debate of 1873-75 revolved around whether or not to invade Korea, ultimately the issue was about the timing of Japan's Asia expedition, reinforcing the sense that Asia was a 'thing' to be desired and subjugated for the sake of Japan's own security. The purported 'punishment' of Taiwan arguing that 'our focus on the East Asian continent should be to maintain security of our Empire by encouraging Korean independence in the north and to bring the south of China, starting from Fujian, into our sphere of interest' (Iriye 1966: 39) . Foreign
Threat and Opportunity Enmeshed
Minister Komura Jutarō repeated this assessment in 1904 when he suggested that China was too weak to maintain its own autonomy (Iriye 1966: 39) . Gotō Shimpei, the president of South Manchurian Railway, stated in July 1907 that it was important to 'encourage the powerful people in China (Shina no yūryokusha) to gain international awareness, and to convince them of the idea of Asia for the Asians as a way for them to understand the essence of Asianism' (Yamamuro 2001: 621) . Thus, Asia was simultaneously a source of threat as it was an opportunity.
Similarly, Ugaki Kazushige, a former War Minister and Foreign Minister in the 1920s and the 1930s, considered China as a potential bulwark against further Western incursion. In his diary (December 1941) , he argued that Japan should have 'tamed' (tenazukeru) China, and co-operated with it to push Soviet Union away from East Asia. Had Japan and China co-operated-and enhanced China's capabilitiesthen this should have been possible. However, he also suggested that if this proved to be impossible, then force should have been employed (Matsuura 2010: 201-2) . Ugaki also recognised that, so long as 'China's unification movement encompassed antiJapanese sentiments, then the survival of both Japan and China was at stake' (Tobe 1999: 249). For Ugaki, China was an opportunity intertwined with threat.
Matsui Ukon of the Imperial Army General Staff Office likened the SinoJapanese conflict to a sibling rivalry within the Asian household (Ajia no ikka): it was a way for the elder brother (Japan) to instil repentance on the younger brother (China) purely out of brotherly love (Matsuura 2010: 512) . Similarly, Foreign Minister Ishii Kikujirō wrote in July 1931 that 'it is imperative that we use our holy interests as a shield with which to refuse pleasure to backward peoples' (Yamamuro 2001, 575) , reiterating Japan's self-professed mission to civilise Asia. Even the liberal foreign minister, Shidehara Kijūrō, stated in August 1931 that 'our interests in Manchuria are inextricably linked to the activities of our nation, and however much we might be generous towards the Chinese government, we have no intention of forfeiting our rights and interests' (Iriye 1966, 96) . The August 1936 meeting of the prime minister, foreign-and finance ministers, as well as the army-and naval ministers stated that, Our continental policy centres on the healthy development of Manchukuo, along with the strengthening of Japan-Manchukuo security alliance. We will realise our economic development through strengthening the Japan-Manchukuo-China tripartite alliance, and by ridding the threat from northern Soviet Union, as well as preparing against the Americans and the British (Iriye 1966: 110). It was this ethnocentricity which justified the War as brought about by the greed of the US and Britain, as stated in the Declaration of the Greater East Asian Conference in November 1943 (Harada 1975: 264) . Hence, Asia was seen as a dangerous neighbourhood that made Japan vulnerable. Simultaneously, Japanese policy elites' confidence in considering Japan to be the most modern nation in Asia implied that Asia became synonymous with opportunity-an opportunity to realise Japan's leadership potential.
While the focus on Northeast Asia, and China in particular, elicited a sense of vulnerability and danger, Southeast Asia was merely seen as an opportunity. Colonel
Watanabe Wataru of the Malayan Military Administration stated in May 1941 that,
The indigenous peoples who had submitted themselves to the British rule for such a long time must be made aware of their need to reflect on their conduct and must be taught to endure hardship as citizens of Greater Asia for its prosperity. They can no longer be allowed to indulge themselves in a hedonistic and wasteful way of life that is eating up their mind and spirit.... The fundamental principle of my nationality policy is to require them to account for their past mistakes and to make them ready to give up their lives and property. Only when they repent their wrongdoing, will I allow them to live, and I will return their property once they repent (Akashi 2008: 39) .
However much condescending such a view might have been, there was a fleeting sense of opportunity as well-an opportunity to turn purportedly backward people into acceptable subjects of the empire. (MOFA 2010b (MOFA , 1486 . Southeast Asia was an opportunity for the Japanese to turn its people into faithful subjects in the imperial project, and as a way to exploit resources. Effectively, Southeast Asia represented a hedge against the existential threat posed by Asia in general. Hence, Asia in prewar Japanese foreign policy narratives enmeshed threat and opportunity: because of the perceived threat emanating from Asia, it also became an opportunity for Japanese government to exploit it in the name of Japan's imperial project.
Japan's Gaze on Asia During the Cold War
The May 1950 MOFA document on economic relations called for pragmatism, stating that 'now that China was lost, it is Japan's destiny (unmei) to expand trade with Southeast Asia' (Hatano and Satō 2007: 5-6) . Superficially, Communist China may have been a threat during the Cold War, but the sense of danger was rather nuanced.
As Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru wrote to John Foster Dulles in December 1951,
The Japanese Government ultimately wants to establish trade and political relations with our neighbour China; and while it is in our best and realistic (genjitsu-teki de saizen) interest, we can guarantee that we have no intention of establishing bilateral relations with the People's Republic of China (Wakamiya 2006: 128) .
Other policy makers shared similar optimism. Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke stated in January 1958 that, Concerning Japan-China relations, the government has so far acted on the course of promoting trade and cultural exchange and of aiming at the solution of fishery and other problems to the maximum extent possible, given the present position of our country, and it wants to go on with this course. I hope and expect that both sides will come to understand each other's position where they have to conduct trade and cultural exchange in the present situation when national relations are not formally restored (Edström 1999: 43) .
Hence, the threat of Communist China needs to be understood within the context of this latent pragmatism within Japanese foreign policy circles.
Communist China as Threat and Opportunity
The focus of Japanese foreign policy on Southeast Asia in the first two decades following the end of the War represented perceived threat, rather than opportunities, from China (MOFA 1957: 13) . As early as 1953, Nakasone Yasuhiro warned that 'it is dangerous to hope for trade with China' given its close ties with the Soviet Union (Kanda 2013: 58) . It is noteworthy that Yoshida himself mentioned similar intentions in November 1954, stating that 'Japan would strengthen its relations with Southeast
Asian countries with the ultimate goal of strengthening the bulwark against "the Communist offensive"' (Edström 1999: 20 Chinese membership of the United Nations 'poses potential danger (kiken) for the future, and therefore needs to be treated seriously' (MOFA 1962: 19 With their foodstuffs and raw materials necessary for sustaining our industries, Southeast Asian states remain important as sources of our imports. Furthermore, as important markets for our industrial products, their importance for the stability and prosperity of our postwar economy means that they are becoming increasingly indispensable.
A similar sentiment was repeated in 1958, when Southeast Asia was identified as an important region for the economic prosperity, as well as political stability, for Japan (MOFA 1958: 35) -an outlook that continued into the 1960s.
To a certain extent, the focus on Southeast Asia was borne of necessity. For Yoshida, Southeast Asia was effectively a 'substitute for the loss of Chinese market' (Edström 1999: 23-24) . At the same time, the region was seen as a source of stability Thus, Asia as a whole continued to be narrated as an entity that posed challenges to Japan's interests, whether be it in the guise of national security or as a test of Japan's postwar international legitimacy. Likewise, Southeast Asia provided a stark contrast to Northeast Asia yet again, depicting a region of relative stability and an important lifeline for Japan. In other words, the challenges of Cold War international politics resulted in the reproduction of a familiar dichotomy in Japan's images of Asia.
Narrating the Reified Asia Today
Contemporary Japanese foreign policy narratives continue to reproduce the dichotomous images of Asia as both an opportunity and a threat, though the stress is 
Asia as Still a Threat
Already back in 1969, a report by MOFA considered China to represent an 'eventual threat' symbolising dangerous Asia (Tanaka 1997: 220 (MOFA 2011: 17) . These events reinforced the worldview shared among foreign policy elites that China and the Korean Peninsula still symbolised risks to Japan's security-very similar to the threat perception at the turn of the last century (Iriye 1966: 30-32) . In short, it was understood as the persistent reality of Japan's Asian predicament.
Not surprisingly, the MOD was more pessimistic. Just as in other official publications, it recognised in its 2010 edition of the Defence White Paper that Asia was a rapidly expanding region, and as such, the region provided Japan with opportunities. However, it also suggested that, 'despite the end of the Cold War, Thus, China's military spending and modernisation defined Asia as a dangerous neighbourhood for Japanese foreign policy circles. The result was the further reproduction of the familiar reification of Asia into signifying threat for Japan.
The then-leader of LDP, Tanigaki Sadakazu, suggested in 2010 that,
China is an important neighbour, and closer relations would bring benefits to our economy as well. Yet, China has a different face (betsu no kao) militarily. Its maritime and airborne operations pose concern for Japan and the surrounding countries. To pretend that we can maintain good relations with China and not worry about it can potentially endanger the security not just of Japan, but also of the Asia-Pacific region (Chūō kōron 2010: 137-38).
This sentiment was reiterated by Abe Shinzō on his second stint as the prime minister.
In a forthright interview with The Washington Post (2013) in February 2013, Abe argued that,
In the process of [patriotic education], in order to gain natural resources for their economy, China is taking action by coercion of intimidation, both in the South China Sea and the East China Sea. This is also resulting in strong support from the people of China, who have been brought up through this educational system that attaches emphasis on patriotism. This, however, is also a dilemma faced by China. That is to say, the mood and atmosphere created by the education in China attaching importance to patriotism-which is in effect focusing on anti-Japanese sentiment-is in turn undermining their friendly relationship with Japan and having an adverse effect on its economic growth. And the Chinese government is well aware of this.
While this did not constitute a conflation, per se, it represented Abe's view that Asia remained dangerous because of China's rise.
Hence, the psychological landscape shared by Japanese policy makers focused primarily on China as a source of threat for Japan's security. And it was China which seems to have represented Asia as a dangerous place. On the one hand, Asia still remained a threat because China made it so. As such, the security-and the larger international-environment has changed since the Cold War, let alone the turn of the last century. Yet, on the other hand, even if today's Japanese policy makers face issues that are different from the previous era, it seems that the reified image of Asia as symbolising threat has been recycled. In short, reified Asia remains relevant for policy makers in 'talking about' the changing international environment.
Asia Remains an Opportunity
Given Japan's reliance on Asian and Chinese economies, it is not surprising that Asia is seen as the next growth centre holding the key to Japan's own economic recovery. 2009 that the US-Japan alliance was important, but suggested that 'Asia is another area where we will need to focus our attention… We are fortunate to be located in Asia, where the economy is expanding' (Sekai 2009: 141) . Reiterating the Trade White Paper, Okada argued that, 'we need to realise Japan's stability and prosperity within the East Asian Community (EAC). Enhancing the economic linkages can only be achieved within interdependence, so it is our policy to construct (kumitateru) our Asian diplomacy' (Ibid.). Here again, we witness the identification of dynamic Asia as a 'tool' to help stimulate Japanese economy.
Gemba Kōichirō, another former DPJ foreign minister, argued that 'a democratic, prosperous, and stable Asia is indispensable for Japan's national interest' (Gaikō 2012: 15) , adding: 'we need to improve our domestic public sentiments (kokumin kanjō) in order to forge more mature Sino-Japanese relations, so that we can enhance our strategic partnership in establishing rules for the Asia-Pacific region' (Gaikō 2012: 17) . For Gemba, the Sino-Japanese relationship epitomised Japan's relations with Asia. In a similar vein, Noda (2011: 100) stated that the 'world around us is changing. Our economic and political position in the Asia-Pacific is also changing. China is the engine for growth; and if China's development is harmonious with the international community, then that provides opportunities for Japan as well'.
Here again, even the changing economic environment of the 21 st century elicited familiar recycling of reified Asia as an opportunity, once again highlighting the inherent dichotomy in the Japanese constructions of Asia as an entity 'out there'.
Southeast Asia as a Beacon of Stability
Southeast Asia is still perceived as an oasis of stability in the region, and the closer relations with ASEAN is seen as a counter-balance to the perceived instability of Hence, Southeast Asia is consistently represented as an opportunity for Japan.
As Hook, et al. (2012: 211) , suggest, Japan at the start of the twenty-first century has worked hard to cement good relations with ASEAN and to realize many of the goals of the Fukuda Doctrine from the 1970s. However, it is important to note that Japan's proactivity towards ASEAN has been driven in large part by concerns that Japan's 'special relationship' with Southeast Asia is now increasingly threatened by the rise of China as a competitor for regional leadership.
This is not dissimilar to the focus on Southeast Asia in the decades following the War.
Southeast Asia remained an opportunity, precisely because Asia, and China in particular, remained a dangerous neighbourhood.
The Implications of Reified Asia
The recent territorial conflicts since 2010 prompted the Japanese government to adopt a sterner language. It is within this context that the debate over collective self-defence had been revisited. The sense of Asia as a dangerous neighbourhood was repeated in an interview given by Kitaoka Shin'ichi, chairman of the committee tasked with assessing the legal framework for collective self-defence. In the interview, Kitaoka suggested that 'there is a country with nuclear arms that infringe our territorial waters.
Unless Japan invests in its own nuclear weapons programme, there is no way Japan 
Conclusions
Tokyo is constantly reminded of the fact that its existence is inextricably intertwined with events in Asia. For Japan situated in the eastern-most edge of Asia, Asia ceases to be a mere geographical designation: it constitutes a reality. Yet, there are multiple realities in that Asia poses both an opportunity as well as a potential threat. From a simple geographical perspective, it is not surprising. Japan cannot wish away neither the nuclear weapons of North Korea, nor territorial disputes with China and South Korea. Simultaneously, Asia provides opportunities, if not a lifeline, for Japan that is lacking in natural resources, as well as a possible solution to its economic problems.
Hence, Asia remains a reified social construct that signify both an opportunity and a threat. Such narratives are becoming more salient following the flare-up in territorial disputes between Tokyo and its neighbours.
The answer to the puzzle of resilient reification seems to lie with the international environment. The consistent reification of Asia into a set of signifiers by generations of Japanese policy elites points to its resilience in providing a continuous psychological landscape for understanding the constraints encountered by the Japanese government. To be sure, reified Asia might be a figment of imagination within the minds of policy makers. Yet, it is precisely due to the policy implications of such social constructs that reified Asian Otherness has remained potent throughout the decades. Put differently, even if Japanese identity had transformed since August 1945, the basic constraints of the international environment seems to have persisted in the minds of Japanese policy makers. The Korean peninsula remains unstable as a byproduct of the Cold War; China still represents both a threat and opportunity for Japan; and Southeast Asia represents a friendly sphere for Japan in stark contrast to the dangerous Northeast Asia. And in order to address these challenges, Asia has been reified into a familiar dichotomy of threat and opportunity. In short, Japanese foreign policy elites recycled the images of Asia to be able to 'talk about' and 'deal with' the complexities of international life in East Asia. Reification enabled Japanese policy makers to formulate and execute policies including recasting military capabilities to address mounting tensions with China, while identifying Asia as a source of economic salvation. These reified images prompted policy makers to take action, and this is the reason why reifications must be said to possess policy implications. To that effect, we need a better handle on reification. Without such an insight, Japanese debates on constitutional amendment, as well as the new thinking on the future defence of the Southwest islands, cannot be fully appreciated. After all, Japan's actions to counter China's rise are 'rational' insofar as they are contextualised within the narratives of reified Asia. The debates on collective self-defence and the launch of the helicopter destroyer are facets of the Japanese Self responding to the meanings attached to the narratives of Asian Otherness.
Hence, reifications are important. Japanese policy makers act on these perceptions. It means that Asia remains an awkward entity for Japan, and despite the narratives such as 'Japan in Asia', the two can never be synonymous, providing a particular template for the formulation of a particular policy preference. As such, Asia remains a 'thing out there' within Japanese policy narratives. Throughout the centuries of Japan's socialisation process in and around Asia, the foreign policy narratives suggest that Tokyo never identified itself fully with Asia, consistently utilising Asia as a signifier for Japan to proclaim itself as neither Western nor Asian.
Hence, Asia remains a 'thing' that is potentially dangerous, but also a 'thing' that is beneficial for Japan. It is to be hoped that the events since the summer of 2012 do not portend a resurgence of Japanese narratives that marked the decades leading up to the 1930s and the 1940s.
